Comparing the Paris Commune and the Kwangju People’s Uprising
A Preliminary Assessment
Full Text
In the past two centuries, two events stand out as unique beacons of the spontaneous ability of thousands of ordinary people to govern themselves: the Paris Commune of 1871 and the Kwangju People’s Uprising of 1980. In both cities, an unarmed citizenry, in opposition to their own governments, effectively gained control of urban space and held it despite the presence of well-armed military forces seeking to reestablish “law and order”; hundreds of thousands of people rose to the occasion and created popular organs of political power that effectively and efficiently replaced traditional forms of government; crime rates plummeted during the period of liberation; and people felt previously unexperienced forms of kinship with each other.
The Paris Commune arose in 1871 as the victorious Prussians moved to seize the capital city at the end of the Franco-Prussian War. The French government’s capitulation and mollification of the Prussians angered Parisians, and on March 18, the National Guard of Paris seized control of the city in a relatively bloodless coup d’etat. Despite the government attacking them, the Communards held out for 70 days of fighting against French troops armed and aided by their Prussian conquerors. They established a functioning government of their own that coordinated defense and daily needs of Paris. Twice elections were held, and the delegates chosen sought to govern the liberated city. Finally overwhelming military force crushed the uprising and thousands were killed in a “Bloody Week” of urban warfare.
Over a century later, the Kwangju People’s Uprising of 1980 occurred at a time when the firepower of militaries was multiplied by several orders of magnitude. There was no conquering foreign army advancing on the city; instead the citizenry rebelled against their own government, which was aided and abetted by the USA. After horrendous barbarity was inflicted on the people of Kwangju by elite paratrooper units, thousands of people fought the military and drove them out of the city. They held their liberated space for 6 days, a far shorter period than the Paris Communards. Inside liberated Kwangju, daily citizens’ assemblies gave voice to years-old frustrations and deep aspirations of ordinary people. Local citizens’ groups maintained order and created a new type of government— one of, by ands for the people. Coincidentally, on May 27—the same day that the Paris Commune was crushed—the Kwangju Commune was also overwhelmed by military force.
Similarities between the two Uprisings
There are remarkable ways in which the quality of the experiences converges. Within these liberated territories, a number of similar dynamics arose:
The spontaneous emergence of popular organs of democratic decision-making
The emergence of armed resistance from below
The attenuation of criminal behavior in the cities
The existence of genuine solidarity and cooperation among the citizenry
The suspension of hierarchies of class, power and status
The appearance of internal divisions among the participants
The most important dimension of these uprisings is their affirmation of human dignity and prefiguration of a free society. Like the Paris Commune, the people of Kwangju spontaneously rose up and governed themselves until they were brutally suppressed. Like the long tradition of Parisian insurrections, the people of Kwangju have repeatedly signaled the advent of revolution in Korea—in recent times from the 1894 Tonghak rebellion and the 1929 student revolt to the 1980 uprising. These uprisings were the produced by the accumulation of grievances and injustice and precipitated by extreme events.
In order to contain the uprisings and prevent them from becoming national, the established governments isolated both cities during the period of liberation. Cut off from the provinces, the Paris Commune nonetheless found supporters and similar communal experiments erupted in many cites, from Marseilles to Tours. In Paris, Communards flew balloons filled with letters to the provinces to try to spread the revolt,1 and circulars for farmers were dropped successfully in some cases.2 In Kwangju, the revolt spread to at least 16 neighboring sections of South Cholla province. Many people were killed attempting to break out of the military cordon around Kwangju to spread the revolt. Dozens others died trying to get into Kwangju to help in its defense.
In both cities, traitors to the uprisings and those that supported the government (including spies and saboteurs sent inside the communes to disrupt and destroy them) were quite significant. Sloppiness/betrayal from within led in Kwangju to the loss of detonators for the dynamite brought by Hwasun coal miners and stored in the basement of the Province Hall. During the Paris Commune, the decision by men to move away from guarding one of the forts overlooking the city led to the loss of a most strategic position—one the reactionary forces soon used to bombard the city with artillery. Paris was “full” of internal enemies; there were riots at Vendome Place and the Bourse, instigated by “loyal” citizens in constant contact with Versailles.
When the halcyon days of liberation were bloodily brought to an end, brutal repression was the order of the day in both 1871 and 1980. Estimates of the number of people executed in the aftermath of Commune range to 30,000, a number that does not include thousands more who were summarily deported to distant Pacific holdings of the French Empire.3 In Korea, hundreds of people simply disappeared, and as many as 2000 died in the uprising. Afterwards, there were seven long years of attempts to suppress the truth and to repress any democratic impulses. The Kwangju uprising continued in new form, and ultimately led to the overthrow of the military dictatorship in Korea.4
The liberated realities of the Communes in Paris and Kwangju contradict the widely propagated myth that human beings are essentially evil and therefore require strong governments to maintain order and justice. Rather, the behavior of the citizens during these moments of liberation revealed an innate capacity for self-government and cooperation. It was the forces of the government, not the ungoverned people that acted with great brutality and injustice. Reading this description of the brutality of government, it is difficult to tell whether it occurred in Paris or Kwangju:
“You shall perish, whatever you do! If you are taken with arms in your hands, death! If you beg for mercy, death! Whichever way you turn, right, left, back forward up down, death! You are not merely outside the law, you are outside humanity. Neither age nor sex shall save you and yours. You shall die, but first you shall taste the agony of your wife, your sister, your mother, your sons and daughters, even those in the cradle! Before your eyes the wounded man shall be taken out of the ambulance and hacked with bayonets or knocked down with the butt end of a rifle. He shall be dragged living by his broken leg or bleeding arm and flung like a suffering, groaning bundle of refuse into the gutter. Death! Death! Death!”5
After the uprisings, repression remained the order of the day for years. In France and in Kwangju, police harassed funerals for years, refusing to allow the somber burial of figures associated with the movement. In France this practice continued at least for 6 years, i.e. even as late as 1887.6 Even after the Kwangju Commune had been ruthlessly crushed, the news of the uprising was so subversive that the military burned an unknown number of corpses, dumped others into unmarked graves, and destroyed its own records. To prevent word of the uprising from being spoken publicly, thousands of people were arrested, and hundreds tortured as the military tried to suppress even a whisper of its murders.
Both uprisings took place after prolonged periods of economic growth. Under the repressive Yushin system of Park Chung-hee, the Korean economy registered great gains in the 1970s, at the price of superexploitation of the working class through long workweeks, low wages and systematic suppression of their rights to organize. In France, output expanded during the Second Empire. Between 1853 and 1869, agriculture grew from an output of 64 to 114, industry from 51 to 78; building from 51 to 105; and exports from 25 to 66. 7 (This index was calculated in constant Francs with 1890=100.) Between 1860 and 1870, national income rose from 15,200 million Francs to 18,800. In 1866, 49.8 Similarly in Korea, Between 1968 and 1979, agriculture grew from an output of 68 to 124; industry from 26 to 220(This index: 1975 = 100), and building constructions increased to 3.6 times, exports to 33.1 times, and national income to 16.8 times. In 1975, 45.9% of Korean people worked in the primary sector, 19.1% in secondary and 35.0% in services.9
Section Notes:
1 Michel, p. 65.
2 Schulkind, p. 152.
3 Williams estimates between 17,000 and 20,000 were killed, “many of whom had been given no quarter but simply butchered.” p. 151. In addition, of the 46,835 cases heard in trials from 1871-1875, 24,000 were acquitted, and of the nearly 13,000 convictions, of the 110 sentenced to death, only 26 were actually executed. p. 152. Louise Michel put the number at 35,000 killed. The Red Virgin: Memoirs of Louise Michel (University of Alabama Press, 1981) pp. 67 and 168. Edwards puts the number at 25,000. p. 42. Patrick Hutton estimates 25,000 were executed at the wall after the suppression of the Commune. The Cult of the Revolutionary Tradition: The Blanquists in French Politics, 1864-1893 Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981) p. 96.
4 See Na Kahn-chae, New Political Science
5 Quoted in Peter Kropotkin, “The Commune of Paris” which first appeared in English as Freedom Pamphlets No. 2 (London: W. Reeves, 1895).
6 Hutton, p. 127.
7 Plessis p. 69. of French people worked in the primary sector, 28.9% in secondary (manufacturing) and 21.3% in services.8
8 Plessis, p. 96.
9 The Bank of Korea, Year Book of Economic Statictics(1981), pp. 132, 142, 178-9, 206, 288
Differences Between the Two Uprisings
Differences between these two historic events are quite apparent. First, the Commune and the Uprising differ in quantity of time. The Paris Commune lasted from the insurrection of March 18 to the final suppression on May 27—some 70 days. The Kwangju People’s Uprising held liberated Kwangju for only 6 days—May 21-27. For political events, however, time is not a key variable—at least as we ordinarily measure it. If one doubts the veracity of the above observation, think only of the impact and significance of one day—September 11, 2001—in the overnight political transformation of world consciousness and political reality.
A more significant difference from our point of view is that in Kwangju, no preexisting armed force like the Parisian National Guard led the assault on power. Rather a spontaneous process of resistance to the brutality of the paratroopers threw forward men and women who rose to the occasion. Many had little or no previous political experience. Some had little or no formal education. All emerged in the concrete context of unfolding historical events. Liberated Kwangju was organized without the contrivance of governments or planning by political parties.
The capacity for self-organization that emerged spontaneously, first in the heat of the battle and later in the governing of the city and the final resistance when the military counterattacked, is mind expanding. In the latter part of the 20th century, high rates of literacy, the mass media, and universal education (which in Korea includes military training for every man) have forged a capacity in millions of people to govern themselves far more wisely than the tiny elites all too often ensconced in powerful positions. We can observe this spontaneous capacity for self-government (as well as the deadly absurdity of elite rule) in the events of the Kwangju uprising. Not only was there no preexisting organization to stage a coup d’etat, but also the leaders of the movement were either arrested or in hiding when the uprising began. On the night of May 17, military intelligence personnel and police raided homes of activists across the city, arresting the leadership of the movement. Those leaders not picked up went into hiding. Already at least 26 of the movement’s national leaders (including Kim Dae Jung) had been rounded up. According to one observer: “The head of the movement was paralyzed.”10 Another that the “leading body of the students’ movement was in a state of paralysis.” 11 Nonetheless the very next morning, students spontaneously organized themselves—first by the hundreds and then by the thousands—to march in protest of the occupation of their city by police and freshly arrived units of the army. As the city mobilized the next day, people from all walks of life dwarfed the number of students among the protesters.12 This spontaneous generation of a peoples’ movement transcended traditional divisions between town and gown, one of the first indications of the generalization of the revolt. On May 20, this capacity for self-government was present in the streets. Tens of thousands of people gathered on Kumnam Avenue and sang, “Our wish is national reunification.” Paratroopers’ clubs dispersed them. At 5:50pm, as the brutality and resistance continued, a crowd of 5000 surged over a police barricade. When the paratroopers drove them back, they reassembled and sat-in on a road. They then selected representatives to try and split the police from the army.13
For days, citizens voluntarily cleaned the streets, cooked rice, served free meals in the marketplace, and kept constant guard against the expected counterattack. Everyone contributed to and found their place in liberated Kwangju. Spontaneously a new division of labor emerged. The citizens’ army, many of whom had stayed up all night, nonetheless were models of responsibility. People dubbed the new militia the “Citizens’ Army” or “our allies” (as opposed to the army, “our enemy.”) They protected the people and the people, in turn, took care of them. Without any indoctrination and none of the military madness that elicits monstrous behavior in armies around the world, the men and women of the Citizens’ Army behaved in an exemplary fashion. Unafraid to impose a new type of order based on the needs of the populace, they disarmed all middle school and high school students.14 When the final assault was imminent, Yoon Sang-won personally insisted that the women and high schoolers among the militants return home so they could survive and continue the struggle. After many protests and with tears in their eyes, they departed.
In the heat of the moment, a structure evolved that was more democratic than previous administrations of the city. In the course of our interviews, we were able to reconstruct an outline of this structure created on May 25 as summarized on the chart below.
Chart 1. Organization of Citizen-Student Struggle Committee
As in Paris, military and police sometimes broke with their orders and sided with the insurgents. General Chung Oong bravely refused to order the killing of innocents, and the police chief in Kwangju, cognizant of the death sentences meted out to police officers who ordered the deadly shootings on April 19, 1960, also refused to participate in the slaughter. Many individual policemen helped wounded citizens and cooperated with the new civil authority once Kwangju had been liberated.
While Korean military and police units acted individually, during the Paris Commune, military and police units were either pro- or anti-Commune. In order to understand this, one must recall that with the war against Prussia demanding action, the French government on August 11, 1870 had organized 200 new National Guard battalions from the poorer classes to fight alongside the 60 battalions already drawn from the propertied classes. When France surrendered and the newly elected National Assembly of February 8, 1871 became hated by the people, the existing National Guard became the source of pride of France, enacting a coup d’etat on March 18. At least 215 of the existing 260 battalions supported the Central Committee of the National Guard, composed of 3 representatives from each of the 20 arrondissements of Paris. In France, the military units which sided with the Commune were at times undisciplined. According to Edwards: “The artillery battalions were in effect more completely a law unto themselves, having their own arrondissement committees, which refused to merge with the main National Guard Central Committee.”15
Confusion and polycentric authority patterns marked the Paris Commune. On March 1, “the guiding personalities of the Paris International still had no definite political program.”16 On March 26, 287,00 men voted, and 90 members of the Commune were elected—but they included 15 government supporters and 9 citizens against the government but also against the March 18 “insurrection.” Alain Plessis puts the number of voters at 230,000 out of 470,000 registered.17 The next day, 200,000 people attended the announcement of the results and installation of the government at the Hotel de Ville. Nine commissions were set up for the governing of Paris, the most socialist being for Labor and Exchange. The government was not the only power to be reckoned with however. In the analysis of one observer, “The Republican Central Committee acted as a shadow government.”18
Despite the presence of as many as 3000 Blanquists in 1871,19 and even though the Commune had its disposal something like 60,000 men, 200,000 muskets, 1200 cannon, 5 forts and enough munitions for years,20 decisive action was difficult. No attempt was made to seize the Bank of France.21 Communal leaders sometimes had orders reversed by one of the groups claiming authority—either the elected government, the Central Committee of the National Guard, or the arrondissements associations. In the first week of April, more than 200 priests had been arrested,22 but on April 16 the elections had a poor turnout.
While the Paris Commune had elections, the elected government was practically powerless, rivaled in military affairs by the central committee of the National Guard and diminished even in political power by the arrondissement associations. Moreover and tragically, the elected government was mired in then personal antagonisms of its members, depleted by the many who refused to serve or resigned, and weakened internally by those loyal to Theirs.
Michel tells us 15,000 stood up to clash with the army during the Bloody Week,23 but when the Versailles army first broke into the city on May 21, there were large crowds listening to a concert in the Tuileries Gardens.24 Even more indicative of the lack of discipline and unity in Paris was a poster of the Central Committee of the National Guard: “Death for Looting, Death for Stealing”25
Section Notes:
18 Roger L. Williams, The French Revolution of 1870—1871 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969) pp. 90, 122, 130.
19 Hutton, p. 30.
20 Lissagaray, History of the Commune of 1871 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967) p. 183.
21 Williams, p. 138.
22 Hutton, p. 81-2.
23 Michel. P. 67.
24 Edwards p. 40.
10 Lee Jae-eui, p. 41.
11 The May 18th…p. 121.
12 The May 18th, p. 127.
13 Lee, p. 64.
14 May 23 Fighters’ Bulletin.
15 Edwards, p. 32.
16 Schulkind, p. 294.
17 Alain Plessis, The Rise and Fall of the Second Empire 1852-1871 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres, 1987) p. 171.
The Paris Commune in the Eyes of Kwangju Uprising Participants
Future historians can debate eternally whether or not the Paris Commune and Kwangju People’s Uprising were similar events. In the present section, what concerns us more than the analytical question of the comparison is the precise meaning of the Paris Commune before and during the Kwangju Uprising as it transpired in the hearts and minds of those involved.
There are two questions we seek to answer in our investigation here. What were the concrete contexts in which the Paris Commune was mentioned, thought about and emulated or avoided by those involved in the Kwangju People’s Uprising? Second, what role did the memory of the Paris Commune play in the actions of these participants?
Through our research, we establish that the conscious memory of the Paris Commune played a role in the events of 1980 Kwangju. Of the 29 interviews conducted by us in 2001, many persons indicated strongly that they had been part of study groups that for a time focused on the Paris Commune before the Kwangju Uprising. Yoon Sang-won attended a 1976 speech given by poet Kim Nam-ju at Nokdu bookstore in which Kim Nam–ju discussed the Paris Commune.26 During the uprising, Yoon sang-won spoke publicly at least once about the Paris Commune in his discussions with other leading members of the U.27
A history major in his undergraduate years at Chonnam National University, Lee Yang- hyun read about the Paris Commune in the 1970s. From his readings, he remembered that “3 to 4-year-old kids threw rocks at the French Army.” Though he thought the preceding an exaggeration, he observed his own 3-year-old son throw rocks at the police during the Kwangju Uprising.28 During high school, Lee, along with his classmate Jung Sang-yong (also a prominent participant) were part of a book club that also focused in part on the Paris Commune. Kim Jong-bae reported that Jung Sang-yong, Yoon Gang-ok, Kim Yong- chol, Yoon Sang-won, and Park Hyo-son were all members of a Paris Commune study group prior to the uprising.29 Yoon Gang-ok described the group as “loose-knit”— meaning anyone could join—and recalled the key role of Professor Lee Young–hee. Kim Hyo-sok read about the Paris Commune during one of the meetings of his “good book club” at the YWCA.30 It should be noted that these clubs, organized by Yoon Young-kyu and Song Gi-suk, attracted a wide following. According to Yoon Young-kyu, 18 readers’ clubs were organized in Kwangju in the late 1970s. Bringing together high schoolers, college students and professors, these groups included “opinion leaders” and leaders of illegal organizations. Many books were available about the Paris Commune, all illegal and many of poor quality.31
Chong Sang-yong remembered reading about the Paris Commune before the uprisings in a group called Kwang Rang (Kwang ju Young men), which had been created after the overthrow of Syngman Rhee on 4.19.61.32 As he recalled, in 1966 the texts were read in Japanese by older college colleagues and then presented in a group of about 20 people—6 from each grade level—who then, in turn, discussed the subject with their own colleagues. Kim Sang-yoon remembered a study group in 1978 that focused on the Paris Commune. “At most 5 people would study together. Each member would then form another group on almost the same topic. Kim Nam-ju got a Japanese book about the Paris Commune.”33
While Lee Chun-hee read intensively about the Paris Commune after the uprising, she recalled that during the uprising, leadings people talked about the Paris Commune at the YWCA, along with the significance of the Argentinean-born revolutionary Che Guevara.34
This proof of the Paris Commune study prior to the Kwangju Uprising illustrates for us how the legacy of uprisings, whether in Paris or Kwangju, consciously or not is to empower the human species to struggle against oppression. Even when an uprising is brutally suppressed—as in both cases here under consideration—their being experienced publicly creates new desires and new needs, new fears and new hopes in the hearts and minds of participants and all those standing in the path of the ripples sent out by the uprisings. As the global revolt of 1968 prepared the ground for the epochal events of 1989 in Russia and Eastern Europe, so the Paris Commune paved the way to the Kwangju Uprising.
Section Notes:
25 Eugene Schulkind, ed., The Paris Commune of 1871: The View from the Left New York: Grove Press, 1974) p. 136
26 interview with Kim Sang-gil 11/07/01 27 Interview with Lee Yang-hyun 6/22/01 28 Interview June 22, 2001.
29 Interview 11/27/01
30 Kim Hyo-sok interview 11/06/01
31 Interview with Yoon Young-kyu 4/10/01
32 10/17/01
33 Kim Sang-yoon 4/15/01
34 Interview 12/21/01
Discussion
In a series of interviews, Lee Jae-eui, author of the definitive English-language narrative history of the KU,35 offered penetrating analysis of the differences and similarities between the Paris Commune and Kwangju People’s Uprising.36 “During the Paris Commune, they had enough time to organize elections and set up an administrative structure. But in Kwangju, there was not the time for the leadership to get authority from the people.” Lee continued: “In response to the situation. I suppose it’s very similar. Even though there were so many differences—ideological, historical, social, cultural—human beings respond to protect their dignity and existence.”
In my interview with Yoon Hang-bong, we discussed the Paris Commune at some length.37 Yoon felt the Paris Commune and the Kwangju Uprising were not similar because the Paris Commune was more “systematic and ideological.” In his view, Kwangju was more “voluntary.” “Peoples’ level of democracy was very low here,” he said. “They believed US ships were coming to help them showing they had no understanding of international political dynamics.” The workers of the Paris Commune had a high consciousness but in Kwangju the workers were not educated. The Kwangju Uprising was “moral”—stores and banks were not robbed. “If they had some conception of class consciousness, they would have redistributed these goods and funds to the poor.” But when we interjected that the Bank of France had also been left alone during the Paris Commune—indeed guarded by the Communards—we decided to continue the discussion the matter at greater length another time.
According to Kim Sang-gil, the Paris Commune and Kwangju Uprising were similar in their community spirit, in the ways people “lived and struggled together” under difficult circumstances. Like the Paris Commune, there were many calls for an uprising before the actual event transpired. Kim recalled how he, Kim Nam-ju and Park Seok-mu called for an uprising in 1972. They secretly threw leaflets at from the administration and law school buildings at CNU on December 8, after which they repeated their action at Kwangju Jeil High School and Chonnam girls’ High School.38 He also mentioned other calls for an uprising.
Section Notes:
35 Lee Jae-eui, Kwangju Diary: Beyond Death, Beyond the Darkness of the Age (UCLA Asian Pacific Monograph Series, 1999).
36 Lee Jae-eui, interview, 3/17/01.
37 10/29/01
38 Interview with Kim Sang-gil 11/07/01
Concluding Remarks
These preliminary remarks point in the direction of future work that could be done to further illuminate the similarities and differences between the Paris Commune and Kwangju People’s Uprising. Among empirical endeavors are studies of crimes statistics before, during and after the uprisings; spatial dynamics comparing the Province Hall and Hotel de Ville in their relationship to the rest of the city; comparison of higher education and religious sectors; developing a chart of the authority structures of the Paris Commune to compare with Kwangju; a fuller comparison of Paris in 1870 and Kwangju in 1980; and documents’ comparison.
Like the Paris Commune and the battleship Potemkin, Kwangju’s historical significance is international, not simply Korean (or French or Russian). Its meaning and lessons apply equally well to East and West, North and South. The 1980 people’s uprising, like these earlier symbols of revolution, has already had worldwide repercussions.39 As a symbol of struggle, Kwangju has inspired others to act. As an example of ordinary people taking power into their own hands, it was (and is) a precursor of a truly free society. To catch a glimpse of such a society we need to look no further than the Kwangju People’s Uprising, for during the brutal reality of May 1980 Korean workers and students briefly tasted freedom.
The example set by the people of Paris and Kwangju in their spontaneous capacity for self-government and the organic solidarity of the population may well be their most important legacy. Alongside these indications of the unrealized potential of human beings today, there were concrete gains—the overthrow of the Korean military dictatorship and the inspiration of other democratic movements—and specific lessons taught through the blood and sacrifices of so many. Today, the uprisings continue to provide all of us with a palpable feeling for the dignity of human beings and the necessity of intensifying the struggle for liberation.
Section Notes:
39 Katsiaficas, “Remembering the Kwangju Uprising,” Socialism and Democracy Vol. 14 No. 1 Spring- Summer 2000.
Bibliography
Stewart Edwards, editor, The Communards of Paris, 1871 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973).
Patrick Hutton, The Cult of the Revolutionary Tradition: The Blanquists in French Politics, 1864-1893 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981).
George Katsiaficas, “Remembering the Kwangju Uprising,” Socialism and Democracy Vol. 14 No. 1 Spring-Summer 2000.
Peter Kropotkin, “The Commune of Paris” which first appeared in English as Freedom Pamphlets No. 2 (London: W. Reeves, 1895).
Lee Jae-eui, Kwangju Diary: Beyond Death, Beyond the Darkness of the Age (UCLA Asian Pacific Monograph Series, 1999).
Lissagaray, History of the Commune of 1871 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967).
Louise Michel, The Red Virgin: Memoirs of Louise Michel (University of Alabama Press, 1981).
Na Kahn-chae, “A New Perspective on the Gwangju People’s Resistance Struggle:1980- 1997,” New Political Science Vol. 23 No. 4 December 2001.
Alain Plessis, The Rise and Fall of the Second Empire 1852-1871 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres, 1987).
Eugene Schulkind, ed., The Paris Commune of 1871: The View from the Left (New York: Grove Press, 1974).
Roger L. Williams, The French Revolution of 1870—1871 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969).
Kwangju in the Eyes of the World (Kwangju Citizens’ Solidarity, 1997).
The May 18 Kwangju Democratic Uprising (The 5.18 History Compilation Committee of Kwangju City, 1999).
Appendix
Interview Log
1 06-Apr-01 Kim Sangjib - a participant of setting fire to the MBC building
2 06-Apr-01 We Sungsam - a participant of setting fire to the MBC building
3 06-Apr-01 Seo Chaewon - a participant of setting fire to the MBC building
4 13-Apr-01 Yi Sungjeon - a participant in Hwasun
5 13-Apr-01 Yang Seunghee - a witness to Kwangju train station on May 21st
6 16-Apr-01 Kim Sangyun - a man who led underground movement
7 18-Apr-01 Kim joonbong - a leader of Investigation Dept. of Citizen-Student Struggle Committee
8 19-Apr-01 Kim gigwang - a participant in Naju
9 20-Apr-01 Yang Dongnam - a participant to the occupation of the Asia Motor factory
10 23-Apr-01 Jung Haejik - a member of Planning Dept. of Citizen-Student Struggle Committee
11 25-Apr-01 Oh Kyungmin - a woman activist and a member of Deulbul night school
12 10-Apr-01 Yun Younggyu - an ex-president of 5.18 Foundation
13 07-May-01 Na Ilseung - a member of Strike Forces
14 09-May-01 Jung Hyangja - a woman labor movement activist
15 09-May-01 Yi gang - a participant of May 1980 & June Uprising 1987
16 11-May-01 Bak Namseon - a leader of Situation Center
17 21-May-01 Bak Haengsam - an active participant in Haenam
18 24-May-01 Kim Gwangsoo - A Buddhist activist
19 28-May-01 Yi Gwangyoung - A Buddhist activist
20 30-May-01 Go Hoseok - an active participant in Buma uprising
21 30-May-01 Kim Hagi - an active participant in Buma uprising
22 31-May-01 Jung Gwangmin - an active participant in Buma uprising
23 31-May-01 Kim Jaegyu - an active participant in Buma uprising
24 01-Jun-01 Sun Manho - a student participant in May Uprising
25 14-Jun-01 Kim Gyul - a participant of setting fire to the Tex Office and Labor Office
26 15-Jun-01 Kim Seonmoon - a participant in Uprising
27 25-Sep-01 Yun Sangwon's father - father of Spokesman of Citizen-Student Struggle Committee
28 03-Oct-01 Yun Gangok - a member of Planning Boards
29 03-Oct-01 Goo Seungjoo - a member of Serving Dept. of Citizen-Student Struggle Committee
30 12-Oct-01 Hur Gyujung - a member of Foreign affair Dept. of Citizen-Student Struggle Committee
31 15-Oct-01 Lee Sungsuk - a participant in Mokpo
32 17-Oct-01 Jung Sangyong - a head of External Affairs of Citizen-Student Struggle Committee
33 19-Oct-01 Lee Sungun - a participant who captured the weapons in Hwasun
34 20-Oct-01 Seo Kyungwon - an activist
35 24-Oct-01 Yang Inhua - a member of the Citizens' Army
36 25-Oct-01 Kim Changkil - a chief of Student Settlememt Committee
37 28-Oct-01 Jung Heain - a member of Song Baekhoe
38 29-Oct-01 Yun Hanbong - an activist
39 06-Nov-01 Kim Hyosuk - an activist
40 07-Nov-01 Kang Hyuna - a researcher on the role of women in Uprising
41 21-Nov-01 Kim Taechan - a member of Strike Forces
42 23-Nov-01 Lee Heungcheol - a member of Strike Forces
43 27-Nov-01 Kim Jongbae- a chairperson of Citizen-Student Struggle Committee
44 28-Nov-01 Jeon Chunsim - a woman who placificated by loud speaker
45 30-Nov-01 Sungyuen - a Buddhist activist
46 21-Dec-01 Lee Chunhui - a woman activist